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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

EDWIN GOSSNER, et al.,
Plaintiffs & Respondents,

v.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT, a Utah
Utah corporation,
Defendant & Appellant,
Case No. 16592
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and
through its Division of State
~nds,

Defendant & Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT,
UTAH POWER AND LIGHT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by landowners against Utah Power and
Light Company ("Utah Power") for ~amages allegedly resulting from
the flooding of the Bear River which, in turn, is allegedly caused
by

the existenc~ of a reservoir behind one of Utah Power's

Power-generating dams.
DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT
The lower court in an order in limine ruled in part as
follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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.
. .
( 2)
The Court rule~ as a ma~ter of law that the only
liability of the defendant, if any, will be limited to flood·resul ting fr~m the filling of the river channel with silt i/~~:,.
by the erection of the Cutler Dam; • . . In other words, the t
_,
committed by the Utah Power and Light Company, if any, for w~rt
1
may be liable to the plaintiffs is the blocking of the chann ch_
.
b
.
1
d
.
e1 ot
the Bear River y s i t cause by the erect lOn of the Cutler Dam.

The Court further rules as a matter of law that with rea,
to the release of waters the standard of care imposed upon the - _
defendant is established by the Kimball and Dietrich decrees ani
inasmuch as it is. stipul~te~ ~hat such releases have never e~cee;,
5,500 cfs, there lS no liability of the defendant either in absoi
liability or in negligence because of release of water from ~e~
Dam.
(3)
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment
Utah Power & Light as against all plaintiffs on the ground that.
statute of limitations is a bar to the plaintiffs' claim be, and
hereby is, denied as made.
The Court holds as a matter of law t'
the three year statute of limitations (which is applicable to
plaintiffs' claims) began to run from the date when the channel cthe Bear River was filled with silt (caused by the erection oft'
Cutler Dam) so as to cause flooding of the adjacent farm land o:
plaintiffs • • . •

( 6)
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Summary
Judgment dismissing with prejudice the complaint of the plaintif'
Ed Gossner and Josephine Gossner, on the ground that they and th1
predecessors have heretofore conveyed flood easements to Utah Po•.
and Light Company be, and hereby is, granted.

It is from the above-quoted portions of the lower court'
order that Appellants appeal is taken.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Utah Power and Light seeks affirmation of the
above-captioned portions of the lower court's ruling.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Th is appeal arises from the same case and same lower cc.
order as the appeal in Case No. 16573 which is also presently bel
the Court.

Both of these appeals are to be consolidated for

purposes of oral argument.

Consequently, the court lS
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a·1 rected

and there is incorporated herein by

f
re erence, Utah Power's
statement of Facts contained in 1'ts b · f ·
rie in Case No. 16573.
Exhibit 1 attached hereto).

(See

Turning to appellants' Statement of Facts in the instant
appeal, appellants make no reference to the record, but their
Statement, however brief, contains several errors.
Plaintiff-appellants do not "consist of 33 farmers having a
claim against Utah Power . . . ", as a simple counting of the names on
the pleading will show.

Plaintiffs consist of over 95 persons, each

of whom claim some interest in 34 parcels of land along the Bear
River between Utah Power's Oneida hydro-electric dam on the north
and its Cutler hydro-electric dam on the south.
All plaintiffs in the instant case have admitted they are
successors in interest to the defendants in the Kimball decree (see
Exhibit 1 for a statement as to its background and provisions), and
are thus bound by its terms.
The affidavit of Dr. James Milligan attached to appellants'
brief, and from which appellants argue the existence of several
issues of fact establishes no such thing.

It is the conclusionary

opinion of one person retained as an expert by appellants which was
filed with the Court on the very day of argument of various moti.ons
before Justice Ellett.
to such affidavit.

Respondent obviously had no time to respond

Fortunately, as subsequent argument will show,

the conclusionary assertions in the affidavit need not be
controverted to establish the merits of Utah Power's argument.
The statement that "Since filing of the Complaint, Utah
Power

&

Light has modified its operation of the system to prevent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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most of the flooding" is totally unsupported by the record

and mu:

be disregarded [see argument, p. 17 infra].
With respect to the ·commencement and duration of the
flooding, and the affects thereof upon appellants' land, the rec :
0

shows that flooding conditions in the area of the river involved.
this litigation, and expressions of concern by the farmers relati·
thereto go back over 30 years.

For instance, Walter Wood,

ooe~

the principal plaintiffs, testified during his deposition thath 9
ceased any attempt to farm his affected land at the end of World
II (Dep. of June 8, 1979, p. 43)
29-30).

(Dep. of Nov. 15, 1977, pp,

Wood admits that he commenced attending meetings with

representatives of Utah Power to protest flood conditions and to
threaten suit in the late 1940's.
18, p. 23, pp. 31-32.)

(Dep. of June 8, 1979, p, 10,:

Plaintiff G. Ellis Doty sent a letter

threatening suit in 1964 [Ex. 173, Doty Dep.J

for flooding that'

occurred during prior years.
Each and every appellant signed a similar interrogatory
answer which stated that "there have been numerous occasions of '
I

flooding over the last 10 years, at varying times, the exact dat'.:
1

of which have not been recorded.
at least

The frequency has been such tr.:·

acres of prime ground has been totally useless d~"

the flooding during the last 5 vears."

(emphasis added)

T~

acreage figure was left blank in most answers, but appellants ha:
stipulated that the blank figure should be filled in with the
acreage figure which appellants claim has been damaged.

Appell<

reiterate that the land has been rendered "totally useless" in r
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I

Reply to Third Amended Answer and Counterclaim of Utah Power
and Motion to Strike (11 IV, p. 2), dated June 13, 1979.

&

Light

Rp. 910.

The aforementioned interrogatory answers were filed with
the court between August 8, 1977 and September 9, 1977 (see Court
docket).

Thus, obviously, all the land in question, to use

appellants' own words, had been totally useless for more than four
years prior to the commencement of this action.l/
ARGUMENT
I.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A.
THE LEGAL QUESTION IS WHETHER THE CAUSE
OF INJURY IS PERMANENT
The parties and the lower court appear to be in agreement
as to the applicable principle of law governing the pivotal issue as
to the commencement of the Statute of Limitations, i.e. whether the
"cause of the flooding is permanent," (Appellant br. p. 5) or
whether it is merely occasional.

In other words, the Statute of

Limitations begins to run from the time that the cause of injury
becomes permanent if, in fact, the cause is permanent.

As Justice

Ellett has stated with regard to the Statute of Limitations, "It is
not the loss of the crop which is of importance; it is the 'cause'
of the loss. "

!I

(Ellett letter to counsel of June 20, 1979)

Appellants in their Brief on Motion to Dismiss mail~d on
June 13, 1979 concede: "The basic high flooding which has
deprived plaintiffs of the use of their lands has occurred
in increasing severity commencing about 1960." (p. 4)
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ESQ

While appellants cite no cases from the Utah Supreme Co::,
anywhere in their brief, there is helpful Utah au th or i ty for thj,
general principle, and it is certainly appropriate to start with,
case law of this state rather than that of other jurisdictions.
Thus, O'Neil v. San Pedro, L.A.

&

S.L.R.Co., 38 Utah 475, 114 P,

(1911), addresses the question as to what constitutes a "permanen:

condition sufficient to cause the statute of limitations to
constitute a bar to recovery.

In that case the plaintiff brought

action to recover for injuries to his house and premises
the operation of the defendant's railroad company.

caused~

The plaintif:

had lived in the house before the railroad was constructed and
argued that the defendant's railroad track was located only 21 f:.
from his house and was operated both day and night, causing his
house to tremble and shake, cracking the walls and making the ho:
uninhabitable.

In determining when the cause of action accrued,

thence when the statute commenced to run,

the court stated:

True, in cases like the one at bar the damage:
must be recovered once for all in one action, and must:'
assessed as having occurred at the time when the first :
injury to the property arose because a complete cause 0: 1
right of action then arose in favor of respondent. To!/
right nothing could be added, since it was just as comp''~
a cause of action after the first train passed the hous:
and shook it and injured it to some extent as it was ai:a hundred trains had passed and had shaken it, and inju:''
it more. Since the railroad was, however, constructeQ.J
permanent structure and was intended to be operated a~
continuing enterprise, the injury and damages to the hc
and premises were also continuing, and could more easi. 1
perceived and understood after a hundred trains had pas'
than they could have been after the fir st one had do~e;
No doubt a person of ordinary intelligence and expene;:
after noting the effect that the passing of one train : 1
upon the house could, in a measure at least, foreshado'.
effect that the passing of a hundred or a thousand sim,
trains would have, and in that way such person could
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approxima~e the depreciation of the value of the premises
for dwel~ ing purposes.
If the action, therefore, had been

brought immediately after appellant had commenced the
operation of its trains, and after the house had been
shaken for a few times only, any person of experience with
special knowledge upon the subject of buildings could have
imagined the effect a continued shaking of the house would
have, and thus, as we have said, in a measure at least,
could have approximated the damages. This is the theory or
method, as we understand counsel, that he insists should
have been pursued rather than to permit the witnesses to
state the actual condition of the house as this condition
was seen several years after the actual cause of action had
arisen. We have already stated, and counsel for both
parties agree with us, that all damages, whether immediate
or prospective, in actions like the one at bar, must be
recovered in one action, and must be assessed as of the
time when the cause of action arose whether the damages
were then actually visible or not. This would, however,
not require the claimant to bring an action immediately,
nor would it prevent him from showing just what effect the
proper operation of the trains had upon the premises in
question, provided he brought the action within the
statutory period to which we have referred.
(emphasis
added).
Johnson v. Utah-Idaho Cent. Ry. Co., 68 Utah 309, 249 P.
1036 (1926), was an action to recover damages for the depreciation
of property caused by a railroad on the theory that the construction
of the railroad was built and operated without authority.

The court

noted that the railroad business had increased within the statute of
limitations period but that "the increase has been the same in kind
and differed only in degree; all of which must have been foreseen
~en the railroad was constructed and put into operation."

P. 1037

The permanency of the injury was shown because the freight was
handled in standard freight cars and long trains, which stopped for
long periods of time and were switched back and forth during all
hours of the day and night.

Also the railroad was a public use·

Therefore, the court concluded that only one action' for past,
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present and prospective damages could be brought, and that the
statute of limitations began to run as soon as the railroad was
constructed·and put into operation.
This rule, as applied to the issue of flooding, is
succinctly discussed in Hayes v. St. Louis
201 at 203, 162 s.w.

266, at 268

&

S.F.R. Co., 117 Mo.k

(1913):

. . The permanent injury, a cause of action f·
which is single and accrues once for all, may be oerrnaiie;:
either from the inherent nature of the iniury itself,as
going to the destruction of the estate or its beneficial
use, or from the nuisance or cause of the injury bein~
permanent. The effect is permanent whether arising from
single act or permanent cause.
The courts frequently)?
down as a test to determine whether the injuries are
permanent and to be redressed by a single action that tn'
damages must be such as 'go to the destruction of the
estate or its beneficial use.'
By this, however, it is·
meant that the land itself must be destroyed in whole a:
part as by washing away the soil or covering it with gra.
or rock.
The beneficial use is destroyed by flooding it
with water or turning loose noxious gases thereon just :I
effectually as by either of the other methods just
·
suggested. Moreover, the result is the same whether lli
water stands on the land all the time, recurs at freque::
intervals or only at such intervals as renders the grow:·
of crops thereon impossible or precarious.
The differeni
is in degree only.
If the cause of the flooding be
permanent, this of itself renders the result perman~t
though arising at more or less rare and irregular but
surely recurring intervals.
1

1

• • . It is already seen that a permanent injurl
may be caused by a purely temporary or abatable nuis~~
as the washing aw~y of soil, etc. On the other hand t\'
injuries in themselves may be purely temporary, as drod
out or washing away of crops, discharge of sewage or
noxious gases, etc., and are permanent only because th:
nuisance causing same is permanent. The injuries
themselves would terminate with the cause but the ca~
being permanent the injury is permanent. The cause~
action is single and the statute of limitation ~ars l!
where the injuries are permanent because the nu1sa~~
causing them is permanent just the same as if the l~
are inherently permanent.
(emphasis added)
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The federal rule is consistent with this analysis.

Thus in

Konecny v. United States of America, 388 F. 2d 59 (8th Cir. 1 9 67), a
landowner brought an action against" the United States for alleged
taking of his property as a result of flooding caused by the
operation of a government flood control dam.

The Court of Appeals

held that where a government dam causes a lake to rise, the statute
of limitations begins to run when the lake reaches its maximum
elevation.

Because the action was filed more than the six years

allowed under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the court concluded the
action was barred.

The Konecny Court quotes from United States v.

Dickinson, 152 F.2d 865, 867 (4th Cir. 1946), aff'd 331 U.S. 745, 67
S. Ct. 13 8 2, 91 L. Ed. 178 9 ( 19 4 7) :
["W]hen a permanent structure erected by
government authority results in invasion of or damage to
land, only one right of action arises. This accrues upon
the completion of the structure and the happening of the
injury, and in this action all damages, past, present and
prospective are recoverable."
A Georgia decision is also on point:
~ility

In Smith v. Dallas

Co., 107 S.E. 381 (Ga. 1921), the plaintiff brought a suit

for damages on a nuisance theory when a dam caused the waters of a
creek to overflow and submerge the plaintiffs' land which destroyed
it for agricultural purposes.

Defendant argued that any right of

recovery was barred by the statute of limitations.

The court stated:

The undisputed evidence showed the following
material facts • . . lands in question, which, if not ~over7d
by the waters of the creek, were fertile and susceptible in
yielding 800 bushels of corn during the years 1910 and 1919
but the dam caused the bed of the creek to fill up with
sand, etc. with the result that its waters over~lowed to
such an extent that no crops could be grown during the
above-mentioned years, practically none s~nce the dam ~as
constructed. While every year the water in the creek is
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-.....

I

rising some and the sand in the water and the plaint'[, i
lands becoming deeper, the fertility of the lands welf
practically destroyed soon after the dam was huilt re
certainly within one year thereafter, and the last'y
·
d
ear
~hat crops w~re ra~se
on the ~and was 1910, and since,.
it has been impossible to cultivate the lands or to
·
1
anything thereon . . . the dam was properly constructe~a ;:
maintained.
In connection with the dam the defendant a
maintained an electrical plant where electricity was
generated and distributed to the public.
Id. at 381-82.

The court ruled that it was lawful under the stat·

for a corporation to maintain a dam across the stream for the
development of water power and other purposes.

However, this

statutory right did not protect it from liability resulting from
overflow or other damages caused by the construction or operatio·
such dam.

The court found that:
. . the construction of the dam being author:
by law, and it being properly constructed and maintainec
and the plaintiff being entitled, under the law, to
compensation for whatever damage that it may have recei··,
a right of action accrued upon the completion of the da:
and the infliction of the injury to the property; and, r
being the statute law of the state that 'all actions fo:,
trespass upon or damage to realty shall be brought witt
four years after the action accrues.'

Id. at 382.
The court dismissed the theory that the defendant was

1

maintaining an abatable and continuing nuisance for:
"
.while it is tru~ that every continuw~l
a nuisance not permanent and which can and should be ab::
is a fresh nuisance for which a new action will lie
[citation omitted] the facts of the instant case fail ti:
bring it under ~he well:settled rul~ of law.
In. the fi: 1
place, the dam in question was not in contemplation of.
a nuisance.
The undisputed evidence shows that the. ;
construction of the dam was authorized by law, that it·
properly constructed and maintained.
This being true,·
cannot be judged a nuisance.
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.
Even if the dam was a nuisance it was a oublic
improvemer; t · · ·properly constructed and maintained, [and]
the ~aw will ~ot co~pel its destruction because of damages
flowing f~om its maintenance. The alleged nuisance -- the
dam -- being permanent and, under such circumstances it is
the sett~ed law of this state that all damages, past and
prospective, must be rec~vered in a single action, and
thereaf~er, no other action therefor can be maintained.
(emphasis added)
Id. at 3 8 3.

Because the plaintiff had not brought the action within the
statute of limitations, the court held that the plaintiffs' cause of
action was barred by the statute of limitations.
Appellants in their brief cite Henderson v. Talbot, 266
P.2d 273 (Kansas 1954).

Utah Power has no quarrel with the

principles quoted from American Jurisprudence therein.
significant portion of the quotation is that:

However, the

"The determination of

the question of whether the flooding of land gives rise to a single
right or successive rights of action depends ordinarily upon whether
ilie injury or the causative condition is permanent or temporary."
Id. p.

(emphasis added)

279.

Perhaps the best evidence of the permanency of the injury,
however, is appellants' claim for damages to crops which were not
~en planted.

In other words, by refraining from planting crops

because of an alleged expectancy_ that such crops, if planted, would
be flooded, appellants' have admitted the predictability of the
flooding, and therefore the permanency of the cause of the flooding·
From this summary of the case law and admitted facts it is
clear that Justice Ellett 's in limine ruling in this regard is
correct - i.e. the statute of limitations began to run from the time
the erection of the Cutler dam initially caused the flooding.
- 11-
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Appellants obviously deny that there is any causation a•

I

all between Cutler Dam and the flooding of appellants' lands, anc•
course are only conceding this arguendo for purposes of the star·
of limitations.

If no ca us a ti on is proved there would be no

liability in any event.

However, if indeed the assumed cause

predates the statute of limitations, then the trial court neednc··
get to the question of causation.

It is certainly unnecessary

t:

burden the court with string citations to establish the
well-established principle that statutes of limitations are salu:
statutes of repose enacted for sound reasons of public policy ani
judicial administration.

The District Court's ruling on the

applicable law should be affirmed.

B.
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CANNOT COMMENCE
"AT THE TIME OF EACH SUCCESSIVE INJURY TO CROPS."
Appellants insist that they are only seeking damages fo:
the loss of crops

(and not in jury to the value of the land), and

that therefore the statute commences to run with each successive
injury.

The trial court perceptively observed that appellants a:

limiting their claim to crop damage because "they fear the statu:· 1
of limitations."

(Tr., pre-trial conf., p.

3, ln. 25)

It is of course difficult for a layman to understand tn'
I

difference between a claim for loss of crops and one of injury t'
land.

However, it becomes even difficult for a lawyer to unders:i

appellants' claim for damage to crops when each of the appellant:'
has stated under oath that their land in question has been rende!
"totally useless" for more than four years prior to the commence:
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of this action.

(See Answer !19 to Utah Power's interrogatories,

filed by various appellants between August 8, 1977 and September 9,
1977.)

Appellants reiterate that the land has been rendered

"totally useless" in their Reply to Third Amended Answer and
counterclaim and Motion to Strike
1979).

Rp. 910.

(~I

IV, p. 2, dated June 13,

Moreover, numerous appellants seek damages to

crops they never planted.

They are going to attempt to quantify

such damages on the basis of the income they may have derived from
such land if it had not been flooded, using the same income approach
~

appraiser might use in giving value to the land.
Such an attempted distinction as to the relief sought is an

outdated use of Dickinsian scrivinership to avoid the legal
consequences of objective facts.

Obviously, Appellants claim damage

to even mythical crops because they realize a claim for damages to
land is barred by the statute of limitations.
The proper legal test, as noted above, as to when the
statute of limitations commences is when the

~

of such injury

commences, assuming that cause to be permanent.
What could be more permanent of man's commercial creations,
than a system of hydro-electric dams?

The facts are undisputed that

the two dams in question have been in operation for more than 50
years.

The facts are undisputed that the manner and method of their

operation has been unaltered since their inception, both as to the
amount of water released from the upper dam (Oneida) and as to the
water level of the reservoir behind the lower dam (Cutler).
IAffidavits of J. Haight, dated June 5, 1979, one in Support of

- 13-
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Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs Gossner Rp.

~ 17 .

, :·

the other in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Against all
Plaintiffs. Rp. 618.)
A permanent structure will obviously create certain
permanent consequences.

The Empire State Building at its

construction could reasonably be predicted to obscure the view f:
the abutting owner of a 10-story building.

Cutler dam could

reasonably be predicted to back up water behind it.

Oneida dam

could reasonably be predicted to release water when it generated
power.
Appellants, sensing the legal danger they are in, nows:to assure us that they are not complaining about the existence a:
the dams, but of their "negligent operation."
so.

This is not quite I

Each of the appellants under oath attributed one of the gro':j

of Utah Power's alleged negligence to be "failure to properly de:.
the Bear Lake-Bear River system in the first instance so that it
could be operated in a manner that flooding of plain tiffs' land
would not occur."

(Appellants' answer 10-A(c) to Utah Power's

interrogatories.)
Appellants also rely upon the con cl us ion ary op in ions
contained in an affidavit of their expert, Dr. James Milligan,,.,:
I

I

they state shows the flooding in question is caused primarily bi·•
factors:
(1)

The building up of sediment in the riverbed,
decreasing the flow-carrying capacity of the chann'
caused by the following:
.

(a)

the backwater effect of the Cutler Reservoir,
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j

(b)

(2)

the fact that the presence of both the Oneida and
Cutler Dams substantially decreases the normal
"scouring out" of sediment buildup which would
occur each spring during the flood season if the
dams were not present.

The discharge of waters from Oneida Dam at volumes and
time-durations which result in discharge of more water
than.the natural channel of the river can carry, thus
causing the excess waters to flood out onto the
farmlands.
(App br p. 3-4)

Assuming arguendo the total validity of such conclusions,
there is nothing therein that suggests that these causes and results
are not the natural and inevitable result of the creation of such
darns, the consequential backing up of water behind them, and the
release of waters "at all times at all seasons of the year" at the
"[operator's] pleasure" at a rate up to 5500 cubic feet per second.
Indeed Dr. Milligan's affidavit confirms the propriety of
the District Court's ruling on this issue.

This cause, if there be

one, is the inevitable and obvious result of the creation of the
system itself.

The planting or non-planting of crops has nothing to

do with the question of causation and, accordingly, with the accrual
of the cause of action or the running of the statute of limitations.

c.
THE CONDITION IF CAUSED BY THE DAMS IS NOT ABATABLE
One of the tests the courts use as to whether a condition
is permanent, thereby starting the statute of limitations to run
upon its initial creation, is whether in fact steps could be taken
by the operator to abate the condition.

Clearly, if steps could be

taken within the realm of reason to solve the problem the condition
may be less likely to be deemed "permanent."

- 15-

For instance, if the
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operator caused a tree to fall over a channel thereby obstructh:
its flow, it is perhaps reasonable to assume that each day he fi:
to remove this situation may result in a new claim for damage !e ..
Gowing v. McCandless, 547 P.2d 338 (Kan. 1976).
Most of the appellants during the course of their

depositions were asked what they would do, if they were Preside~t ·
Utah Power

&

complaining.

Light, to solve the problem about which they were
Many said they had no answer.

dams should be blown up.

A few said that the
ma~

Others suggested dredging, although

of these people had some years before signed a petition which
admitted that dredging was not economically feasible.

They coul'

not suggest how environmental factors could be resolved nor did:
have any idea how long a time any such dredging would be effecti:
The appellants could agree on only one thing - that the problem
could be "abated" by the payment to them of money.
Dr. Milligan, appellants' expert, was not much more
I

helpful.

He suggested that reduction of the level of discharge'

Oneida and lowering Cutler reservoir might alleviate, but not
eliminate the problem.

But as of May 29, 1979 he had no opinio:. I

to what the quantity of reduction in release or the level of thE
reservoir should be.

(Dep. p. 60)

Rather than dredging, which'

said could well be "very expensive", he

di~

suggest that

construction of a new canal might be a possibility.

But he had·

idea as to what this would cost or where it might be placed.
p. 76)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 16-

1

~',

1

Appellants do make the argument that the condition is
obviously abatable by Utah Power because in fact that there has been
no flooding in the 3 years since the filing of the complaint.

(The

record is far from clear on that issue - numerous appellants do make
claim for flooding damage during this period.)

This argument is a

classic example of the spurious maxim, post hoc ergo propter hoc.
Appellants reason that because there has been no flooding for the
past 3 years

(appellants make no attempt to substantiate this by the

record), this must have been the result of a conscious decision by
Utah Power to modify its manner of operation of the dams.

This

totally ignores the fact that the amount of water released is
dictated by at least two factors:

(1)

the amount of water coming

down the Bear River from snow pack melt and rainfall (1976, for
example, was a draught year) and (2) the demand for electric power
created by consumers.
these.

Utah Power has no control over either of

This allegation of appellants is totally unsupported by the

record and should be stricken.
The impropriety of this allegation is accompanied by a
point which, while not improper, is absurd.

In its "Statement of

Facts" appellants state that for these three years "in an effort to
determine whether or not they could justify planting their lands,
they served interrogatories on Utah Power inquiring as to whether or
not they could anticipate flooding, which interrogatories the Power
Company has consistently failed to answer in a manner which would
justify the farmers planting their lands."

(App. br. P· 4)
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How or why Utah Power should have any greater
than appellants in th is regard is never explained.

presci~~

An augury of

appellants' bird livers in predicting this would be every bivas,
effective as Utah Power's.

D.
UTAH POWER IS NOT ESTOPPED TO RAISE THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Appellants advance the amazing argument that because
various plaintiffs have been making claims against Utah Power si::
1948 (Appellants br. p. 13), and because as the result of numeroc
studies and analyses Utah Power has consistently denied, and
continues to deny, that it either caused the problem or is liabl: I
for it, and therefore rejected these claims of plaintiffs, that:
some way Utah Power is estopped to raise the defense of the

stat~:I
I

of limitations on claims which appellants on the face of their br"
admit have been made for over 30 years!
It is not surprising that appellants cite

absolutelyn~

one case supporting this proposition, because none exists.

The

application of estoppel to the statute of limitations is rather i
applied, when it is applied at all, to exactly the opposite fact:j
situation.

It is applied where a party against whom a claim has

been made lulls the claimant into sleeping on his rights by
admitting liability and giving assurances that the situation wou:
be corrected.

(See 43 A.L.R. 3rd 756 - Limitation of Actions_:

Estoppel to Plead)
It is certainly basic hornbook law that one need not ad:
liability in order to plead the statute of limitations.
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As

1

discussed earlier, the law clearly allows determination on the
applicability of the statute of limitations before even getting to
the merits of a claim.
Indeed, appellants' very argument emphasizes the validity
of the trial court's ruling that appellants' cause of action accrued
once and for all when, by plaintiffs' own observation, the cause of
the damage became apparent.

Appellants, by their own admission,

have been pressing these claims for 31

years~

(Utah Power submits

that when the full record is made, the evidence will show threats of
suit were made even earlier than this, but for present purposes 31
years will suffice.)

This is not the case of a one or two-time

event caused by extraordinary circumstances (e.g. Kunz, et al v.
~ah

Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1975)), but is by

appellants' own admission a long time, continuing condition of which
appellants have been aware for over 3 decades.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSTRUED THE APPLICABILITY
OF THE KIMBALL DECREE TO RELEASES FROM THE ONEIDA DAM
Utah Power has discussed the history of the Kimball and
Dietrich decrees in its own appeal now before this Court (Case No.
16573, Appellants' Brief, pp. 3-8, pp. 14-16).

As it is assumed

that these two appeals will be argued and decided together, for
convenience of the reader, copies of such references are appended to
this brief as Exhibit 1, as well as Appendix A thereto.
Justice Ellett properly ruled that Utah Power could not be
liable for release of waters from Oneida dam so long as the terms
relating to such release in the Kimball decree (which incorporates
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the Dietrich decree) were not exceeded.

As it is not disputed t'

the maximum release never exceeded 5500 c.f.s., the district co'J"
ruled that no claim could be made because of this operation.l/
Appellants ignore the history, over-all purposes and
wording of these decrees.

These were actions brought by

Utah~~

over 50 years ago to obtain a final judicial determination of th'
respective rights of Utah Power and all of the landowners

alo.~g:

Bear River both in Idaho and Utah, both with regard to irrigatio'.
water and the use of water by Utah Power for the generation of
electricity.
The decrees gave Utah Power the right "to impound all t··
waters of the Bear River to the extent of 5500 cubic feet per sec
of time . . . to be thereafter released.

.at the said plaintiff':!

pleasure • . . for use at various po in ts of divers ion now existing, I
which may hereafter be established by the plaintiff [Utah Power!
the generation of electric power."
Appellants make two points on this issue.

They argue f.,I
!

a flow rate of 5500 c.f.s. reflects waters at flood stage and tr'/

I

"historically" there have never been discharges during the crop
seasons of July, August and September.

r

Conceding, arguendo, the I

veracity of such factual statements, th~ point is obvious from::

!
!

'l/

Utah Power's only quarrel with the learned trial court:'
ruling is that it did not go far enough and is inte'.na:: 1
inconsistent. Utah Power contends that the same pnnci,
should apply to the effect of the downstream reservoir,'
behind Cutler dam, and it is from this inconsistency t:
it is taking its own appeal.
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perusal of the decrees that Utah Power is not restricted in any way
to use of the waters at a particular time or season.
8ecrees state specifically to the contrary.

Indeed, the

Thus waters shall be

released "at the said plaintiff's [Utah Power's] pleasure."

The

rights exist "at all times and at all seasons of the year."

The

rights to direct and use water for the generation of electric power
are "continuous throughout the year without limitation to time or
season."
Appellants further argue that the decree states that such
waters shall be released through the "natural channel" of the
river.

They then refer to a portion of the affidavit of their

expert which states, " . . . the natural channel [in areas relevant to
this action] will overflow its banks when the river contains a flow
of approximately 3,400

c.f.s."l/

Assuming again, arguendo, the accuracy of appellants'
alleged facts,

it is submitted that the conclusion to be reached

from this is exactly the opposite of that urged by appellants.
There is no question from the decrees as to the allowable maximum
rate of release authorized (i.e. 5500 c.f.s.).

There is no question

from the decrees that Utah Power has total discretion as to where,
when and for what duration such maximum release can be made.

If in

fact, as appellants' expert contends, a release in excess of 3400
'I

:I

21

What Dr. Milligan apparently intended to say was that where
the river flows through the lands in question a flow rate
in excess of 3400 c.f.s. will overflow the "natural
channel." He does not say what he understands "natural
channel" to mean.
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c.f.s. would overflow the banks of the "natural channel'' then t'
reinforces Utah Power's argument that the decrees gave it rights,,
created in appellants corresponding burdens - to bear the natural
consequences of such releases -- to wit:

1

that Utan Power was gh !

by the decree a right to that extent to flood abutting lands and·'
that extent there was created an easement in the landowners to a:
this to happen.

If the decrees were to be construed otherwise

t~,

allowed maximum rate of discharge would have to be qualified, anc
course no such qualification exists.
This whole issue was judicially determined and is legat:I
binding upon appellants.

As Utah Power suggested in its briefo·i

its appeal, if appellants believe that conditions have sufficie":
changed so as to make continued enforcement of these decrees
inequitable they can petition the District Court which retained
continuing jurisdiction of this matter for a modification.

But

until such modification is obtained these decrees continue to
establish the standards of operation upon which Utah Power is
entitled to rely, and appellants have no standing to sue in a
separate action for money. damages.
III.

EDWIN & JOSEPHINE GOSSNER WERE
PROPERLY DISMISSED FROM THIS CASE
Plaintiffs Gossn er are unique amongst the plain tiffs i:,
this case.

Their land, which they claim has been flooded by rec::

of the action of Utah Power, is subject to flood easements gran'."
to Utah Power for very substantial consideration
4/17/78 at p. 9).

(Gessner Dep.

In exchange for Utah Power's payment, Gossne'
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executed on June 4, 1953, an easement and a release and covenant not
to sue to the Power Company.

The easement provides, in pertinent

part:
. · .Grantors [Gossner] . . . hereby convey and warrant to
Utah Power & Light Company . . . an easement to flood
impoun~ and withdraw at will, water on, over and from' the
following ~escribed land located in Cache County, State of
Utah, to-wit: that part of the following described land
lying North and East of the brow of the hill and located in
Cache County, State of Utah, to-wit: . . .
The Grantor reserves the rights to pump water out
of Bear River and to erect sand or other dikes along the
bank of Bear River to restrain the water in its natural
channel; PROVIDED HOWEVER, that the reservation of such
rights shall not be construed to impose upon the Grantee
[Power Company] any duty or obligation to so manage its
operations or installations as to protect the fixtures or
personal property on the said real property or to allow
access to the said real property for the construction of
dikes, AND IN NO EVENT shall the Grantor maintain a civil
action of any kind against the Grantee for damages caused
by the flooding of the said real property or other damage
caused by or arising from exercising the rights granted by
said easement.
(Emphasis added)
so long as the grantee shall maintain the water level at
any dam now owned or hereafter constructed by it in Bear
River Canyon in Sections 26 and 27, Township 13 North,
Range 2 West, at an elevation not to exceed 4,405 feet
above sea level, Utah Power & Light Company Cutler
construction datum, as determined by bench mark located on
top of brass not embedded in west inside wall of Cutler
hydroelectric station on a projected center line of
generating units, the elevation of which is 4,284.170 feet.
Tue release and covenant contain essentially the same language and,
~addition,

the following:

And for said consideration above named, the·s~id
Granters do hereby release and forever discharge the said
Grantee its successors and assigns, from any damages that
may res~lt from future flooding or impounding water ~n the
following described land in Cache County, Utah, to-wit:.
It is further understood and agreed th~t this
settlement is the compromise of a doubtful and disputed
claim and that the payment is not to be construed as an

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 23-

admission of liability on the part of Utah Power & Li h
Company by whom liability is expressly denied.
(emph~s'.
added)
It is undisputed on the record that since the Gossners

granted the easement and executed the release and covenant not to

sue the elevation of Cutler reservoir has never exceeded the lev

set forth in the easement (Jay Haight Affidavit in Support of Mo
for Summary Judgment against Gossners, R. p. 616).
The Gossners do not dispute any of the above, but they

claim that at the time of the execution of the easement, covenant

not to sue, and release, that certain representatives of Utah p01

declared that "there would be no more flooding to be expected on,

lands than he had been experiencing in previous years" and furthe,
"told him that he could continue to use his lands for farming
purposes as he had in the past."

(App. Br. p.

20)

The Gossners

further contend that the question of "negligent abuse" of the
easement is a jury question.

The documents in question of course contain absolutely n
hint of any such alleged oral representations.

Indeed, to the

contrary, Utah Power is given the right "to flood, impound and
withdraw at will, water, on, over and from . . • " the Gossners'
land.

There is no conceivable ambiguity in these documents whic'

would allow modification by oral testimony.

But even i f there"'

it is well established that in documents of this type they shou!
construed against the Gossners.
f

th

The easement must be construed against successors o, h,
gran tor, since it was not gra tu i to us but one for whic
consideration was given and compensation paio.
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Griffeth v. Utah Power

&

Light, 226 F.2d 661 at 667 (9th Cir. 196 6).

The easement in Griffeth was construed against successors
of the gran tor, even though they may not have had actual notice of
it.

Gassner himself executed the release in the present case, and

his attorney, M.C. Harris, witnessed it (See Easement).
It is not mere coincidence that these documents fully
recite what they do.

The Power Company paid substantial

consideration and granted Gassner the right to pump water from the
river and to erect dikes along the river in exchange for Gossner's
express promise not to sue the Power Company for releasing water as
allowed by the easement.

Gessner, a man of substantial business

experience, accepted the Power Company's money and signed an
easement and a release and covenant not to sue that are clear and
unambiguous on their face.

It is well established that a releaser,

having ability and understanding, must familiarize himself with the
con ten ts of a written release and exercise prudence in signing it.
Kelley v. Salt Lake Transportation Co., 100 Utah 436, 116 P.2d 383
(1941).

The release Gossner signed is fully enforceable and bars

Gossner 's action.

The document Gessner signed is also a covenant

not to sue, which is also fully enforceable.

Holmstead v. Abbott

G.M. Diesel, Inc., 27 Utah 2d 109, 493 P.2d 109 (1972).
Any allegations of alleged oral representations, whatever
they were, must be disregarded as a matter of law.
As to the claim of "negligent abuse" of the easement, the
Gossners cite Griffeth v. Utah Power & Light Co., 226 F.2d 661 (9th
Cir. 1955), failing to point out that .the holding of the trial
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court, affirmed by the Ninth Circiut, was that the existence

Oft

flood easement in that case barred a claim for negligent floodi,
n'.

The flood easement in Griffeth gave the power company

certain rights "provided future fluctuations shall not exceed the I
heretofore occurring in the operation of the Oneida plant."

The,

power company introduced by affidavit evidence that was
uncontroverted that "water had been fluctuated at the dam in exac:
the same manner at the time of the flooding upon which the compi:
is based as it had been doing the period prior to the date of th'
grant."

Since the water had been released by the defendant in

,

1

accordance with regular custom and in accordance with the terms

vi

the easement, it was held there was no cause of action.
~ ~i

The execution of the easement in itself is enough
this action.

As the Ninth Circuit concluded in Griffeth, supra,/

If defendant had purchased the right to bacl< water up:'
a dam and overflow lands, which right was conveyed by
written instrument, damages could not be awarded agains:
for per forming the act it had purchased a right to perL:
Id. at 226 F.2d 662.
Of course, if Utah Power had changed its method of
operation so that its fluctuations exceeded those heretofore
I

occurring, and if it was negligent in so doing, then the
would no longer be a bar to a claim for negligence.

easeme~·

In other wo:1

the easement established the standard of care which the power
company must exercise.

If the limitations of the easement were,

negligently exceeded, an action in negligence would lie.

Thus i:

power company has no quarrel in the abstract with the statement'
the Court l·n Kunz v . Utah Po wer

&

L1"ght Co ., 526 F.2d 500 (9th.
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1975), affirming an instruction that despite an easement Utah Power
"was not entitled to negligently flood those lands unnecessarily."
unfortunately the record is silent as to the exact terms of these
easements and the limits placed upon the power company's use of them.
The record here however is quite clear in this respect.
Gassner granted the company the right to "flood, impound and
withdraw at will, water, on, over and from" his land.

He further

discharged the company from past damage and released it from "any
damages that may result from future flooding or impounding water" on
such land.

The easement remains effective by its terms "so long as

the water level" at Cutler dam does not exceed a certain height.
Gassner makes no contention that this condition has been breached,
and the easement is thus still operative.
Gossner further cites as support for his position Johnson
v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 167 P. 2d 834 (Idaho 1946) although it is

difficult to understand why.

In Johnson the operator of the

reservoir dam had raised the reservoir over 25% above the level it
was at the time the easement was granted and the court sitting in
equity en joined this chan.ge in operation.

In the instant case there

has been no change in the operation of the dams or reservoirs since
the dams became operational over 50 years ago.

If anything, Johnson

is au th or i ty for the posit ion of Utah Power.
There is no jury question here because there are no
disputed facts with which to go to the jury.

To hold otherwise

would cause chaos in this state and put in jeopardy all such rights
obtained for valuable consideration over many years throughout
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Utah.

The issue is similar to that involving the Kimball and

Dietrich decrees.

It was to prevent precisely such a situation,, .
• I

this that the flood easements were obtained in the first place ..
Gossners were properly dismissed.
CONCLUSION
After years of complaints and threatened suits, and afte:
learning of a distinguishable but successful prosecution of a c)a:against Utah Power in Idaho, appellants have commenced this acticIn obvious recognition of the legal obstacles con fr on ting them,
appellants have woven an improbable scenario of distorted facts::
legal theories in an effort to revive their otherwise moribund
claims.

This has been accomplished through pleadings which bear

little relationship to the facts as admitted by the plaintiffu.
Perceptively going behind the pleadings to the factsu
admitted by appellants and as he is required under Rule 56, Justi:
Ellett has ruled that this action will proceed on the basis oft:'
law as established by this Court, and the facts as introduced in'.
evidence.

I t is submitted that this is not only the province, b.

also the duty of the learned trial judge, and in this regard his

I

rulings addressed herein should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

I ·/(

day of October, 1979.

FABIAN & CLENDENIN
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1

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

~
I hereby certify that on the~ day of October, 1979, I

personally mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Reply
Brief of Appellant, Utah Power & Light Company, to the following:

Robert C. Huntley, Jr., Esq.
HUNTLEY, RACINE & OLSON
P.O. Box 1391-Center Plaza
Pocatello, Idaho 83201

Richard L. Dewsnup, Esq.
Michael M. Quealy, Esq.
301 Empire Building
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Gordon J . Low, Esq.
HILLYARD, GUNNELL & LOW
175 E. First North
~gan, Utah
84321

' 6

·
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EXHIBIT

II

l"

STATEi-1ENT OF FACTS

I

Plaintiffs are over 95 individuals O\ming interests i·I
some 34 parcels of land lying along the Dear River between th:
Oneida electric generating dam on their north and the
electric generating dam to the south.

Cut~r

Both dams are a part of

Utah Power's hydro-electric generating system along the Bear
River, and have been in operation for over 50 years'.
Utah Power is a public utility in the business of He'
!

generation and sale of electric power to the people of the

I

State of Utah.

1C

A portion of this electric power is generatea

by a system of hydro-electric dams and facilities located alor::B
the course of the Bear River as it winds its way from Bear

,F

1

)I

-2-

'ol
I
,Ut

:1.
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Lake, through Idaho and Utah and eventually into the Great Salt
Lake.
In the generation of electric power through this
cyslem of dams Utah Power is regulated by the States of Utah
and Idaho and the United States government.

It operates under

appropriate licenses from each of these governmental entities.
In addition, Utah Power exercises its rights of operation of
its system of dams and reservoirs on the Bear River pursuant to
~o

different judicial decrees.

The first such decree was

1entered by the Honorable F. S. Dietrich, District Judge of the

I

1

District Court of the United States for the District of Idaho,
Eastern Di vision, in an action entitled Utah Po\ver

&

Light

I

,Compan_v v. The Last Chance Canal Co., et al., in Equity No.
203, filed on July 14, 1920 ("the Dietrich decree.").

A copy of

the Dietrich is contained in the Record on l\ppeal, p. 708 - 824.
The second decree is one entered by the Honorable
James Kimball,

District Judge of the District Court of the

'

,First Judicial District of the State of Utah in and for the
I

1co'unty of Cache, in a case entitled Utah Power

&

Light Co. v.

'.filchmond Irrigation Co., et al., Case No. 1772, filed on
I

1Febrnary 21, 1922 ("the Kimball decree").

A copy of the

Kimba 11 decree is conta i ;-ied in the Record on Appeal, P ·

6 37 -

' 707.

The Kimball decree incorporates by reference the terms

fof the Dietrich decree, which was entered into evidence in the
,Utah act ion.

The Dietrich decree provides in part, at pages

:7-s:
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• • . Utah Power & Light Com~any has the right to divert a i
the Stewart Darn . . . and to impound and store in the Be t
Lake Reservoir.
all the waters of Bear River to thear
extent of 5500 cubic feet Per second of time, together,· ,
.
.
. .
. said lak'·lth
the waters natura 11 Y fl owing
into
or arising
in
all said waters to be stored in said reservoir, and to b:s,
thereafter released from the said reservoir at the s~
plaintiff's pleasure, through the plaintiff's embankment
. and thence do;m the natural channel of Br=ar River, fo;'
use at various points of diversion now existing, or whi~h
may hereafter be established by the plaintiff for the
generation of electric power.
The Dietrich decree further provides, at page 8:

In its exercise of the rights herein defined, the plaintiff
may, to the extent of its various appropriations, divert
and impound in storage, the waters of Bear River and of
Bear Lake at all times and at all seasons of the vear, when
by so doing it does not interfere with the exercise of a~
prior rights fixed by this decree, and the waters released
by it from storage may be conveyed through the natural
channel of the river, and shall be protected under the·
provisions of this decree for the distribution designated
by the plaintiff, as though kept and conveyed within an
•a,
artificial channel, and the return of the waters to the
river, after their various uses by the plaintiff, shall not
be deemed an abandonment thereof, but it is recognized ~
this decree, and it shall be recognized by the officers
Pi
charged with the administration hereof, that the
plaintiff's rights in said waters continue throughout the r1
portion of the stream brought under this decree for use
both in Idaho and beyond the Utah-Idaho sta.te line, and all
parties to this suit, their heirs, executors,
administrators, successors in interest and assigns, and t~ '
agents, servants and attorneys of said parties, their
heirs, etc., are hereby perpetually enjoined and restrained
from in any manner using or interfering with the use by t~
plaintiff of the said released stored waters, except with
the consent and under the authority of the plaintiff, its
successors or assigns.
(Emphasis added)
1

The Dietrich decree further provides, at page 10:

at

"Power Rights" include the right to divert and use
water for the generation of electric power, and such rights
of diversion and use are continuous throughout the year
without limitation to time or season.
,de
The Dietrich decree further provides, at pages 12-13:
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The plaintiff, Utah Power & Light Company, and the
defendant, Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, have certain rights to
the use of the waters of Bear River with points of
diversion i~ Utah below the Utah-Idaho state line, which
rights are included iti the schedule of rights herein
decreed.
The inclusion of said rights in the said schedule
is not to be construed as a decree in rem, establishing
said rights, or as an adjudication of title to said rights,
which have attached in a state or district beyond the
jurisdiction of this court, but merely as a recognition of
said rights to the extent that in the administration of
that part of the river within the jurisdiction of this
court, and the operation of this decree as hereinbefore
defined, the watermaster, commissioner or other official
charged with the administration of the decree, shall see
that there is delivered at the Utah state line such
quantity of water as is necessary, together with natural
increment below said Utah state line, to satisfy said
rights in accordance with their dignity and priority as
herein recognized.
In addition, the Idaho court retained jurisdiction to

lminister the decree in the State of Idaho.
As stated, the Kimball decree, which adjudicated the

irti.es rights within the State of Utah, incorporates by
~ference

the Dietrich decree:

The quantity of water released from such_sto~age and
to which the plaintiff is entitled, flowing in Bear
River at the Utah-Idaho state line at any given time,
shall be determined as provided in the final decree of
the District Court of the United States for the
District of Idaho, Eastern Division, in Equity No.
203, wherein Utah Power & Light Company, the plaintif!
herein, was plaintiff, and Last Chance Canal ~ompany,
Limited, et al, were defendants, a copy of which
decree has been introduced in evidence in this
cause.

: page 6.
The Kimball decree, at page 7, among other things

>fines power rights as follows:
"Power Rights" include the right to divert and
use water for the generation of electric ~ower and
such rights of diversion and use are continuous
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throuqhout the year without limitation to time or
season.
The defendants named in the Kimball decree were
all the adjacent landowners up and down the relevant
portions of the Bear River and its tributaries within the
State of Utah at the time the action was brought.

The

Utah court specifically enjoined these defendants, their
heirs, executors, administrators, successors in interests
and assigns, and the agents, servants, attorneys of said
parties, their heirs, executors, administrators,
successors in interest and assigns, "from in any manner
using or interfering with the use by the plaintiff [Utah
Power] of the said released stored waters.

II

Kimball

decree at page 7.
Plaintiffs in the instant case have admitted that
they are successors in interest to the defendants in the
Kimball decree, and are thus bound by its terms
(Defendant's Request for Admissions, 11/7/77), R p. 396.
The Kimball decree also reserves jurisdiction in
the Cache County Court for the purposes of

administr~tion

of the terms of the decree.
Simply summarized, in a Utah judicial proceeding
which lasted alm0st five years (the complaint was dated in
August, 1917), Utah Power was given the right to release
up to 5500 cubic feet per second of water into the Bear
This

River for the purpose of generating electric power.
right could not have been given in broader terms:

"rs J uch
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.

rights . . and use are continuous throughout the year

'without limitation to time or season.
released . . . at Utah Power's pleasure.
and at all seasons of the year.

(The waters can be)
at all times,

(The release of such

waters) shall be protected under the provisions (of the

•Kimball decree) for such distribution as may be designated
by [Utah Power] or its successors in interest, to the same

, extent as though kept and conveyed within an artificial
channe 1. "
Moreover, the defendants in the Kimball decree
(and therefore the plaintiffs herein) are perpetually
"enjoined and restrained from in any manner using or
interfering with the use by [Utah Po1·1er J of said released
stored waters", .and the Cache County Court retained
jurisdiction to adminster and enforce those provisions of
the decree.
The Utah Supreme Court has, on several occasions,
, reviewed actions of the Cache County Court in the exercise
~ its continuing jurisdiction to implement the Kimball
1

decree.

•££.:.,

(See~ Utah Power

&

Light Co. v. Richmond Irr.

115 Utah 352, 204 P.2d 818 (1949); Utah Power & Light

~v. Richmond Irr. Co., 80 Utah 105, 13 P.2d 320 (1932);

1~ Power

&

Light Co. v. Richmond Irr. Co., 79 Utah 602,

' 12 p. 2d 3 5 7 (19 3 2) •
Since the issuance of the decrees it is
'Undisputed that Utah Power has at no time exceeded the
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authorized release of 5500 cfs. from Oneida dam (the dam
upstream from plaintiffs' land).

R.p.

618.

Plaintiffs in the instant action have sued Utah
Power under theories of absolute liability and
negligence.

They allege that their lands adjacent to the

Bear River, and several miles upstream from the northern
reaches of the Cutler Reservoir, have been flooded
resulting in damaged crops and pasturage.

It is further

alleged that this flooding is the result of the build-up
of silt in the river channel which, in turn, is allegedly
caused by the presence of the Cutler Dam.
The case was assigned specially to The Honorable
Albert H. Ellett who on June 19, 1979, held a hearing on
various motions which had been filed by the respective
parties.

Among other things, Utah Power had moved for

summary judgment against all plaintiffs on the grounds
that the Kimball decree was res judicata, having set the
standard of care required of Utah Power in the operation
of its system of dams on the Bear River, a standard
admittedly having been conformed to by Utah Power at all
relevant times.
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B.

The Kimball Decree Precludes Application of Strict
Liability and Dictates Dismissal of this Action.
The background of and relevant parties to the Kimball

decree are set forth in the factual recitation above.

The

original complaint in that case was filed by Utah Power in
1917, and it.took almost 5 years to obtain the Decree in
question.

It specifically bound landowners along the Bear

-14-
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River in Utah and their successors in interest, including by
their own admission each of the plaintiff-respondents in this
action.
The very purpose of that lawsuit was to define the
rights and obligations of the respective parties with regard to
the use of Bear River waters for the generation of electric
power and for irrigation, and to avoid problems such as are
created by this lawsuit.

The lands involved have since the

date of the Kimball decree in 1922 been burdened with the
rights granted to Utah Power by such decree.

These rights

include the express authority to erect and operate a system of
dams provided that the storage and release of waters does not
exceed a rate of 5500 c.f.s.

It is undisputed that the Power

Company has at no time exceeded this restriction.
The rights which the Kimball decree gave to Utah Power
A fortiori created correlative servitudes which burden

plaintiffs-respondents' lands to the extent of such rights.
Hence, the right to release up to 5500 c.f.s. of water carries
with it a burden upon the land of the plaintiffs-respondents to
the extent of the natural consequences of such release,

-

·~nd.,.to

that extent created as a matter of law an easement right in
Utah Power, and a subservient duty on the part of the
landowners for the natural and ordinary consequences of the
action legally authorized.

A servitude to this extent has

already been determined by judicial decree.

If this were not

so, then the rights given under the decree would be meaningless.
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Thus, not only is it improper to hold Utah Power to a
standard of absolute liability, but as long as Utah Power does
not exceed the limitations set forth in the Kimball decree, the
claims raised by plaintiffs are
case.

~

judicata in the instant

That very question has already been judicially

determined, and this action should be dismissed.
This argument was affirmed in Johnson v. Utah Power &
Light, 215 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1954), once again a case dealing
with Utah Power's Bear River system.

An action was brought

against Utah Power in Idaho for damages caused to a landowner's
property by reason of release of water from one of Utah Power's
dams.
~

For some reason Utah Power in that case did not claim

judicata by reason of the Dietrich decree (the decree

applicable in Idaho) .

However, in dismissing

th~

claims on

other grounds the Ninth Circuit stated:
The majority of this court are agreed that
the prior decree [the Dietrich decree] would
constitute competent and material evidence in support
of a claim of res judicata had it been pleaded and
introduced by the defense. Id. at 816.
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